

Agency: Still Price Lintas

Author: Justin Kent

Peperami: The Consequences of Unleashing the Beast

INTRODUCTION

This story demonstrates how the insight into peoples' intimate relationship with eight inches of meat led to one of the most exciting, provocative and undoubtedly successful food campaigns ever to be produced.

BACKGROUND

Peperami arrived in this country by mistake back in 1982.

Mattessons, the importer, was expecting a 40 foot container load of pt from Germany but instead were lumbered with five tonnes of salami sticks on the Dover quayside. Unwilling to apportion blame, they off-loaded the surrogate pt with their van delivery system and the brand has never had to look back since.

Well only once. On 4 December 1987 a warning appeared on the *News at Ten* not to eat Peperami for fear of catching salmonella. The brand was immediately delisted and returned 12 months later in a pasteurised form and protected by a 'sheath'. Within eight months, sales had regained the rate of sale enjoyed before the scare.

This miraculous recovery can be partly accredited to the advertising at the time. When Peperami reappeared on the shelves, it was accompanied by new advertising. Advertising which cleverly confronted the apparent contradiction between meat and snacks by turning the meat aspect into a competitive edge, delivering a more assertive taste over other snacks such as crisps. Sales grew year on year consistently thereafter by approximately 15% in volume up until the end of 1991.

Although the campaign was still alive and kicking in 1992, penetration of Peperami had plateaued and volume growth likewise had slowed (see Figure 1).

There was little doubt the relaunch ads had achieved their objective of establishing awareness and knowledge of Peperami. In fact, by 1992, 90% of the Millward Brown sample knew it was a snack made of meat compared with only 38% back in 1987. However, with trial generation at an all time low, the executions were obviously no longer provoking a relevant and motivating reaction.

The business objective defined, therefore, was to regain the rate of trial experienced in earlier years whilst increasing the frequency of purchase among core users.

PUTTING PEPERAMI UNDER THE MICROSCOPE

We were in no position to decide whether the successful but tired campaign merely needed refreshing or whether a new approach was needed to achieve this business objective.

What we did know, however, was that this was no ordinary, conventional product. The way it arrived in this country, the way it recovered its sales after a national health alert and the way *Anglers' Weekly* would enthusiastically endorse Peperami to its readers as an effective fishing bait merely suggested there was more to this product than we really knew about!

Our first step, therefore, was to conduct a semiotic analysis of the brand: a psychological interrogation of the product which would hopefully unearth the root cause behind this mystical behaviour. These couch sessions revealed Peperami suffered from (or enjoyed) a truly schizophrenic personality. It appears the brand has a unique ability to straddle both meat values (power, masculinity, real food) and snack values (fun, unisexual, improper food) simultaneously. Because these two paradigms (meats and snacks) are so diametrically opposed, Peperami is literally pulled in opposite directions and, as a result, is left hanging there, suspended in a confused state of flux - in a world of its own with its own rules and its own agenda.

All the additional product features, the phallic shape, the condom inner-wrap, the tactile, bright green, deceptive packaging and the explosive taste act as material evidence for this frenetic, wild confrontation between meat values and snack values, thus ensuring Peperami's schizophrenia remains well and truly incurable.

So, the brand's extraterrestrial origins were confirmed. But without confronting the consumer to bring some earthy realism to this

madness, we would be no closer to finding out how to develop new advertising.

THE CONFESSIONS OF A PEPERAMI EATER

In March 1992 we conducted a piece of qualitative research to attempt to understand the consumer relationship with the brand and its advertising. We discovered something no one had anticipated.

By conducting confessional depth interviews and friendship groups with Peperami users, it materialised they had an almost fanatical relationship with the brand which, over time, had become far more powerful than its advertising.

This 'bond' consumers shared was evident in how they ate it, where they ate it and how they talked about it. Whether they be 7-year-old little girls in playgrounds or 20-year-old lager louts in the 'local', there was this common, almost ritualistic appreciation for the brand and its personality.

It's great for when you come back pissed from the pub, yank open the fridge, pull out a Peperami and rip it open - you don't need any manners for it.

Male, 20

Peperami is my wicked willie!

Female, 13, The Research Practice

It appeared Peperami had this eerie ability to bring out the child in everyone - their regressive streak - but in a humorous way.

Children and young adults alike would affectionately refer to the brand as being bizarre, mischievous, anarchic, impulsive, rebellious and manic in personality.

The only ones who were less inclined to be so expressive were their mums who were buying the product for the family at the supermarket. They were simply happy to endorse the consumption of something more nutritional than chocolate. It was almost as if young consumers were intentionally keeping their special, somewhat crude relationship with Peperami to themselves.

It was clear the existing advertising did little to contribute to this relationship. It was perceived to be far too 'well-behaved', conventional and clinical for a brand which is eaten in a regressive mode, with a bottle of cheap wine and a dirty video or with a fag behind the bike sheds.

It was also clear that, thanks to the semiotic work we did earlier, this bizarre but incredibly intimate relationship had evolved from the product itself and its schizophrenic identity crisis rather than from some weird youth phenomenon that had nothing to do with the product.

These consumer confessions not only highlighted why the existing advertising was no longer inspiring usage but also how the new communication strategy could be developed. If non-users already knew of Peperami and its meat content (as Millward Brown would suggest) and still were not being tempted, we could use this controversial, manic personality to reinvigorate interest in the brand. After all, because this brand personality is so deeply rooted in the product's rational make-up, using it would have the effect of dramatising Peperami's meatiness in a much more relevant and provocative way.

57 WAYS OF SKINNING A PEPERAMI

Using the personality of the brand to excite and provoke trial was all very well but with such a personality disorder the creative challenge was as much dangerous as it was exciting.

Not only could this anarchy and rebellion turn into a destructive, vicious, uncontrollable force but how do you find a creative expression for it which appeals equally to 7-year-olds and 20-year-olds without alienating mums by letting them into their offspring's secret world? And because of the varying interpretations of Peperami's multi-faceted personality, according to consumers, the character portrayal could take the form of Arnold Schwarzenegger, Nigel Kennedy, Fred Flintstone, Roy Chubby Brown, Alf Garnett, James Belushi, Vinny Jones or Iago!

So, to ensure we exhausted all possible creative expressions, four working propositions were written from a matrix which reflects the parameters of Peperami's personality. All four rely on the mischievous personality of the brand to communicate the product's meatiness but tonally in very different ways.

Figure 2

Adcepts were produced to these four propositions - 57 in all. They are literally advertising concepts or perhaps better defined as 'scamp creative expressions', in this case of Peperami's personality. They have the benefit, in research, of being treated as rough ideas rather than 'real' ads by consumers and by their very nature are much more efficient in exhausting the strategic opportunities. Handled like a deck of cards, they became the focal point of a qualitative project. Kids, young men and mums alike would use them as an essential crutch to help express and clarify their feelings towards the brand and its persona.

Out of this research we learned exactly how to manage this personality. For example, adcepts with crude and base connotations, although

true to the brand, not only alienated mums but distanced young users by making an aspect of the brand public which they would rather keep to themselves. Similarly, sheer aggression, although a by-product of the brand, failed to represent the shrewd, deceptive side of Peperami's mentality. However, three adcepts in particular hit the mark spot on. All three cleverly depicted the deceptive nature of the product, as if the brand is getting some sort of kick from deceiving, surprising and even shocking the consumer without being overtly aggressive.

It's mischievously going out of its way to shock. You can't cage the taste.

Male, 17

It's untamed. You don't know how it will behave.

Male, 18, RDS Research

References to 'beast' and 'wild' in these adcepts were suggestive of an untamed, uncontrollable animal constrained by the confines of its packaging: an image which not only reflected Peperami's manic personality but also its blatant spicy, carnivorous product nature. The exclamation mark, on the other hand, boldly epitomised the ballsy confidence of Peperami and its mischievous desire to shock.

Suspense, surprise and deception - all the essential ingredients to provoke the necessary intrigue and trial among potential users.

CALCULATED MADNESS

The creative brief became the distillation of all the accumulated learning: the semiotic analysis, the confessional research and the reactions to the adcepts. Learning which was clearly reflected in the one idea which the creative team presented four weeks later.

The creative idea centred on an animated Peperami character. A creature with an attitude whose antics embodied all the brand's manic personality traits identified by consumers, wrapped up with an arresting, controversial and disarmingly honest endline 'It's a bit of an animal!'

The risqu nature of the creative idea demanded we sensitively validated the campaign both in qualitative research in concept form and quantitative pre-testing with finished film. The initial concept research confirmed the richness and appeal of the idea.

The product and personality mirror each other in the advertising and are inextricably linked. By dramatising the provocative, deceptive side of Peperami, the campaign successfully nurtures the unique relationship with the Peperami consumer whilst creating the necessary intrigue and curiosity among non-users. Both young adults and young children alike feel the campaign was written for them personally and no one else, whilst mums turn a blind eye knowing their children will love it!

Crucible Research

Likewise, the Millward Brown pre-test research endorsed the campaign on every measure from branding to impact, from comprehension to appeal and from product communication to likelihood to try. At this point of time, however, the validity of its predictions, were yet to be proven.

THE MEDIA STRATEGY AND PLAN

All the accumulated learning which fuelled the development of the advertising, equally played its part in driving the media strategy.

With the smallest budget in the snack market our ambitions were to make the biggest noise. We wanted Peperami to be on everyone's lips, in pubs, at school, at home, everywhere. Because we knew we could not out-shout Suede, Sega and Jurassic Park we relied on the very tactics Peperami himself would deploy: surprise, deception and suspense...

1. Spend 75% of the budget in the first two weeks to generate the initial hype, attain a satisfactory level of exposure of the six executions and reinforce the manic energy of the creative idea.
2. Then withdraw swiftly from television altogether to initiate a whispering campaign on the ground. The free 'word-of-mouth' advertising we all dream about.
3. Finally, return two weeks later with a very light 'drip' strategy, teasing and reminding the audience that what hit them in the initial burst was not simply a figment of their imagination. Continue this 'drip' for as long as the money would last (ten weeks).
4. Opt for a single TV buying audience of 16-24 year old males, taking into account the aspirational nature of younger children. But in addition, intentionally avoid the obvious youth programmes. The effect of our Peperami ads in a *Coronation Street* break (and even *Songs of Praise*) would do far more justice to the brand's mischievous personality than a spot say in *The Word*. By blackballing terminally trendy programmes we could distance ourselves from overtly youthful advertisers, never wanting to appear alongside Tango, Sega and Pepsi Max.

Figure 3

THE PEPERAMI 'BIG BANG'

The outcome of the initial advertising concept qualitative research not only fuelled the excitement and confidence to progress to production, but also initiated a whole flurry of activity back at Van den Bergh Foods. The strength of the advertising paved the way for the successful negotiation of new listings in the key multiples and more importantly the acceptance of dual sitings in all multiples (in the chiller cabinet and on the deli counter top) - a first in the history of the grocery trade!

It was not the fact that Peperami was spending 800,000 on TV, which impressed the trade - afterall it was a smaller budget than 1992 - but the very nature of the immediately impactful advertising idea which they gleaned from, by now, rather tatty ex-research storyboards. They were the ones who demanded the dual siting, not Van den Berghs: ironic, considering the millions of pounds confectionery manufacturers spend in trying to get a second listing!

For best effect, it was agreed these distribution and siting gains would start on the very day of the TV launch. In collaboration with a below-the-line agency, a display box using the advertising idea was produced to take full advantage of the new deli counter top position.

The date was set for 3 July - the day quickly became nicknamed the 'Big Bang'.

THE GROSS EFFECT OF THE 'BIG BANG'

The 'Big Bang' existed because of the advertising. According to Van den Berghs, there is no doubt, neither distribution gains nor dual sitings would have been secured without a campaign of this creative standard. We will prove the total incremental sales by the 'Big Bang' consist of both direct and indirect advertising effects. We will only use, however, the direct advertising effects to demonstrate the campaign's effectiveness.

Sales

In July, Nielsen recorded tonnage sales of Peperami were up by 54.5% on June and up 75% year on year - four times greater than any previously recorded monthly sales increase. In August, this record was promptly broken when sales were up 65% on June's figures.

But the sales effect of the 'Big Bang' was not just limited to the advertised period.

The launch of the advertising on 3 July conveniently allows us to use the first six months of 1993 as an index to set against what happened in the following six months. From 1 January to 2 July there was no support whatsoever for Peperami. As a result, monthly sales were constant with only a +/- 5% deviation. This consistency in sales is indicative of Peperami's normal year-round performance. There is no seasonality in Peperami sales whatsoever. We can naturally take these first six months, therefore, as a realistic base level for comparison. The effect of the advertising in July and August was dramatic against this index with 49% and 59% increases respectively, but its effectiveness was still significantly visible even in December with sales up by 22% on the first six months of the year.

Figure 4

In fact, the average running rate for the second half of the year was 21.2 tonnes/month higher than that for the first half. A 35% increase in the average monthly running rate (source: Nielsen).

Splitting the year up by quarters, rather than halves, quarter 3 saw a 42% increase in sales over quarter 2 whilst there was still a 23% uptake in sales in the fourth quarter over the second.

Van den Bergh Foods' own delivery figures confirm this dramatic sales uplift.

TABLE 1: PEPERAMI DELIVERIES

	Average monthly tonnage	% change on Q2
Quarter 2	80.0	-
Quarter 3	121.4	+51.8
Quarter 4	96.3	+20.4

Source: Van den Bergh Foods

Peperami's market share also climbed to an all time high of 90.2% in July - a 4% share gain from own-label. Peperami managed to defend this gain throughout the latter half of 1993.

In value terms, Peperami sales grew by 60% in 1993. Since sales were constant in the first half of the year, virtually all this growth can be attributed to the last six months.

Trial

Since the core advertising objective was that of provoking trial of Peperami, we must attempt to assess the extent to which this dramatic sales increase effected actual trial of the brand rather than merely frequency of purchase among existing users.

Based on 11 years of experience, the entry point for triallists of Peperami has been the single stick, whereas existing, loyal users are more predisposed to the multipacks (five sticks). By splitting out sales of single sticks and multipacks over the July-December period we can tentatively demonstrate the levels of trial verses increased frequency of purchase.

Figure 5

It is reassuring to see increased sales of single sticks holding up against the better value multipacks, suggesting new users have joined the Peperami club. However, although a strong relationship may exist between variant sales and 'user-type', we cannot conclusively prove the extent of the trial generation based on this correlation alone.

For more concrete evidence, an NOP Omnibus study was conducted in January 1993 and repeated 15 months later to gauge any shifts in penetration of Peperami (see Figure 6).

A total of 4,058 adults (all 15+ years) were interviewed across the two waves. By April 1994, the proportion of the population having ever tried Peperami had grown by 40% - in just 15 months. For a brand which took 11 years to achieve a 25% penetration, this is a dramatic shift.

Although we have no data on frequency of purchase and repeat purchase, this certainly proves trial contributed significantly to the sales uplift.

CALCULATING THE NET ADVERTISING EFFECT

The gross effect of the 'Big Bang' was a 35% increase in the monthly running rate and a 40% increase in penetration.

To calculate the net effect of the advertising we must subtract the sales effects from the two other elements of the 'Big Bang' (and any other influential variables), regardless of how critical the advertising was in securing such elements.

Distribution gains

The following table details the distribution gains which were secured before the campaign but which only became active at the time of the TV launch.

TABLE 2: PEPERAMI DISTRIBUTION GAINS 1993

Store	Product variant	Sterling distribution change %
Gateway	Hot 5 pack	40-100
Safeway	Hot single	77-100
	Hot 5 pack	15-60
Tesco	Hot 5 pack	0-50
Asda	Hot 5 pack	42-100
Sainsbury	Single	0-90
	Hot single	75-100
	Hot 5 pack	75-100

Source: Van den Burgh Foods

It is important to point out here that these distribution gains are merely for variants of Peperami. Because the brand is already listed in all of these outlets in the form of other variants, actual number of outlets stocking Peperami remains unchanged.

The other significant factor to take into account is the degree to which multipacks cannibalise single stick sales. The introduction of a multipack into a store which lists a single stick on average cannibalises 50% of single stick sales (source: Van den Berghs).

These two factors help explain why the increase in rate of sale for Peperami almost exactly mirrors the total sales increase. The average monthly ROS for the last half of 1993 was 34.4% up on that for the first six months.

Compare this to the 35% average increase in total sales and it is clear the growth has been demand-led rather than distribution-led.

Figure 7

Van den Bergh's own data confirms this. Their delivery figures can be accessed by individual store and individual variant/pack format. We can, therefore, subtract the gross effect these new distribution gains have had on total monthly Peperami sales by totalling the last 6 months of data for 1993.

TABLE 3: VOLUME CONTRIBUTION OF NEW DISTRIBUTION GAINS

Store	Additional tonnes/month from new listings
Gateway	0.10
Safeway	0.15
Tesco	0.12
Asda	0.10
Sainsbury	0.50
Total tonnes/month	0.97

Source: Van den Bergh Foods

The total contribution to sales from these new distribution gains alone was on average 0.97 tonnes/month (40,000 sticks) between July and December 1993 - only 4.5% of the additional sales achieved.

Their contribution to trial generation must be even more negligible, since the extreme nature of Peperami Hot (which takes up most of the distribution gains) limits appeal to existing Peperami users.

Dual sitings

Although Peperami has had ad hoc sitings on the deli counter in the past, it has never managed to secure an extra siting in every major multiple at the same time. Since these first appeared in the week of the new advertising they will undoubtedly have contributed significantly to the effectiveness of the advertising both in terms of sales and trial. Most of these deli-top stands were still in operation at the end of 1993.

Arguably, these deli-top stands with designs which fed directly off the campaign idea, were literally an extension of the advertising in-store. One could argue the case further that eliminating the very sales channel, designed and set up specifically to help convert the interest generated from the advertising, will unfairly downplay the advertising's effectiveness.

Regardless, we still want to isolate the second siting from the sales in order to prove the raw advertising effect. Unfortunately, neither Nielsen data nor Van den Bergh delivery data split out sales from the deli-top. And since every store listed the second siting we are not able to establish a control against which the effect of the extra siting can be compared. In order to negotiate permanent dual sitings, Van den Bergh's undertook a trade survey to quantify the contribution from these deli-top stands. Each retailer was asked to supply sales figures from the two sitings, which were then collated and analysed at Van den Bergh.

TABLE 4: FREQUENCY OF DELI -TOP BOX REPLACEMENT JULY-DECEMBER 1993

Boxes per Week	% of Stores
0-1	55
1-2	25
2-3	10
3-4	5
4-5	5

The results of the survey show that, on average, the deli-top stands were refilled once a week during the six-month period. In total, 4.2 tonnes of Peperami sales a month went through the deli-top stands.

Subtracting both this amount and the 0.97 tonnes generated by the distribution gains from the gross sales uplift of 21.2 tonnes, leaves a net effect of 16.03 incremental tonnes a month. For the six-month period from July to December 1993 this running rate is 26.6% higher than that for the first half of the year.

Seasonality

We have already touched on the seasonality aspect of Peperami. Peperami sales over the 11 years in UK have shown no seasonal trends whatsoever. The greatest variance in monthly sales in the previous 4 years has been +/- 10% (source: Nielsen). Such nominal shifts can be attributed to past advertising, promotions, distribution gains and stock levels, but never has there been a climatic or seasonal relationship observed.

Variant launches

There were no variant launches in 1993. The main Peperami variant launched was Peperami Hot in July 1992. Initial sales were spectacular yet subdued slightly by some cannibalisation of Peperami Original. By the time the new advertising appeared 12 months later, trial and frequency had stabilised. Although one of the commercials in this new campaign featured this new variant, thus increasing sales, its share of total Peperami sales has remained constant throughout the last half of 1993, at just under 20%.

Because of the extreme taste of Peperami Hot, we expect the sales uplift to have come from existing Peperami consumers rather than from non-users. Hence, penetration of 'ever tried' Peperami will not have been significantly effected by Peperami Hot.

Peperami-in-a-Roll was also launched in September 1992. However, it was not featured in the advertising and, as a result, sales and trial since July 1993 have remained sluggish.

Pricing

Peperami's RRP, accepted by all grocery retailers remained unchanged in 1993. The price was increased at the end of 1992 from 39p to 45p, making it two thirds more expensive than a Mars Bar and even more difficult for trial generation. Own-label salami sticks also maintained their prices during 1993.

Promotions

The brand ran neither promotions during the advertised period nor in the subsequent months. The nearest promotion was in March 1993 for Peperami Hot in limited stores.

Competitive influences

Peperami's only significant direct competition is from Tesco and Sainsbury salami sticks who jointly account for approximately 8% of the meat snacks market (source: Nielsen). Retailing at a price 10% below Peperami, these two competitors have never supported their salami snacks in any way which could have influenced either theirs or Peperami's performance.

At the end of 1993, both retailers delisted their own brands. We can only conclude the effectiveness of Peperami advertising had a part to play!

Other possible influences

In the lead up to or during the campaign period there was no relevant consumer PR positive or negative on any subject which could have impacted on sales. Any PR generated by the advertising itself was limited to business and industry press.

As for the product, since the pasteurisation back in 1988 the make-up of Peperami has remained unchanged. The packaging is still the same as it was when the product arrived in the UK in 1982.

Summary of the advertising effect on sales

We earlier highlighted the Nielsen figures for Peperami, which confirmed a 35% monthly increase in volume sales for the last six months of 1993 compared to the first six months.

We have now calculated that 23% of these incremental sales can be attributed to what some may call non-advertising factors (which we would prefer to call indirect advertising factors). Discounting the fact that the advertising idea literally negotiated those crucial dual sitings and distribution gains (which have since become permanent fixtures), we can conclude the raw, net effect of the advertising campaign is a 26.6% volume uplift in average monthly sales during July to December.

If you were to continue to exclude those indirect advertising factors you would see this uplift peaking during the campaign in July and August, when net advertising-related sales were up 38% and 45% respectively over the first six months. The effectiveness of the advertising was still clearly visible later in the year contributing 17% of extra sales in December.

Figure 8

In total tonnage terms for the second half of 1993, this equates to an incremental gain of 96.2 tonnes (or 4 million sticks) - equivalent to an extra 1 months worth of total Peperami sales calculated at the running rate before the campaign.

Although profit details and payback periods cannot be disclosed here, based on these net advertising effects alone, the return on investment for the campaign was phenomenal.

Although we had tough targets to meet, to experience such an advertising payback from a campaign for an 11 year old product is just unheard of.

Simon Turner, Marketing Director, Van den Bergh Foods

As a result, business objectives for 1994 were dramatically reviewed (upwards naturally), whilst the marketing budget for the following year was doubled.

CONFIRMING THE CORRELATION BETWEEN ADVERTISING AND SALES/TRIAL

So far we have demonstrated by a process of subtraction and elimination the raw advertising effect on Peperami sales.

Quantitative consumer research was commissioned to gauge the degree of direct correlation between Peperami advertising and people's propensity to purchase.

A pre and post Millward Brown survey was conducted amongst the two target groups, children aged 7-14 and young men aged 16-24. A group of mothers of children aged 18 and below was also incorporated into the sample to monitor potential degree of alienation, if any. The pre-survey was conducted in mid-June, the post late September 1993.

We will demonstrate how the high levels of advertising awareness, recall, appeal and communication have directly effected Peperami's popularity, people's interest in and expectations of the product and finally their likelihood to try the brand.

Advertising awareness

When Peperami appeared in *Marketing's Adwatch* survey in week two of the campaign, at number 11, behind ten campaigns with significantly heavier advertising spends, we naturally anticipated good awareness levels amongst our core targets.

However, this did little to prepare us for the news that the advertising achieved the second highest advertising Awareness Index (AI) ever recorded in this country by Millward Brown who have been monitoring directly or indirectly most campaigns aired in the last 18 years! (see Figure 9)

The ad Awareness Index acts as a measure of branded visibility. The average Awareness Index from a random sample of 300 of the most recent campaigns tracked by Millward Brown is 4. Peperami's estimated awareness index among 16-24 year old males was 40, which would suggest for every 100 TVRs spent behind this advertising, the brand's ad awareness level would be increased by 40%! Ridiculous it may be but no one would question the unique ability this advertising had of immediately grabbing peoples attention - even the notoriously difficult 16-24 year old male consumers. Among 7-14 year old children the Peperami ad Awareness Index was a record-breaking 26 and for mums, who were never intended to notice the advertising, an AI of 15 was measured!

For prompted advertising awareness, Peperami was placed in a list of competitive brands, most of which were receiving above-the-line support within the first six months of 1993. After the campaign, Peperami visibly outscored all of them.

TABLE 5: PROMPTED AD AWARENESS: SNACK BRANDS
16-24 YEAR OLD MEN

Pre		Post	
	%		%
Mars	47	Peperami	67
Walkers	42	Walkers	41
McCoys	38	Mars	37
Penguin	32	McCoys	30
Kit Kat	31	Penguin	28
Baby Bel	16	Baby Bel	28
Peperami	11	KP Nuts	27
KP Nuts	9	Kit Kat	22
Branigans	7	Branigans	11

Base: pre 511; post 418
Source: Millward Brown, 1993

TABLE 6: PROMPTED AD AWARENESS: SNACK BRANDS
7-14 YEAR OLD CHILDREN

Pre		Post	
	%		%
Milky Way	52	Peperami	62
Walkers	47	Monster Munch	48
Mars	38	Walkers	44
Monster Munch	36	Baby Bel	38
Quavers	30	Mars	25
Baby Bel	29	Milky Way	24
Kit Kat	27	Penguin	24
Penguin	25	Quavers	23
Hula Hoops	16	Kit Kat	19
Peperami	12	Hula Hoops	12

Base: pre 225; post 412

Source: Millward Brown, 1993

The media ambition of making the largest noise with the smallest budget had certainly been achieved. What is also certain, is that not just any advertising could have achieved this awareness, but only advertising of Peperami's quality with the originality, attitude and sheer intrusiveness to penetrate the hardest of consumers.

Advertising recall

A testimony to this is the strength of the advertising recall: 87% of young men ad aware correctly recalled one or more of the executions and 75% of children ad aware played back detailed sequences from the ads. Kids in particular had an outstanding ability to quote verbatim from the Peperami character.

He's watching a film and it's in a salami shop and a man takes a Peperami off a rack and starts slicing it up. The Peperami turns around and says 'I like a good horror film' and starts laughing.

Male, 14 years, Millward Brown, 1993

Even recall of the endline 'It's a bit of an animal' was high considering the newness and media weight of this campaign, with one in three of those children and young men who claim they remember the advertising, playing back the line word for word.

Advertising appeal

Overall reactions to the campaign were almost universally positive. It appeared the advertising had generated high levels of empathy amongst all samples. 81% of kids ad aware rated the advertising as good or very good whilst 84% of young men recalling the ads mentioned elements they like. As for mums, dislikes were kept to a manageable level below 25% - a level of negative comment not dissimilar to mainstream popular campaigns like 'I Can't Believe It's Not Butter' or 'Domestos'. We were relieved to discover alienation of mums was never to be an issue.

Figure 10

Advertising communication

Considering the campaign communication rested entirely in the hands of the wild Peperami personality, rational take-out from the advertising was very good. One in two mums and young men spontaneously translated the personality into a relevant, rational product benefit eg, spicy, hot, nice to eat, tasty or genuinely different, whilst 78% of children agreed the advertising clearly conveyed the spiciness of the product.

But what effect has all this advertising awareness, recall, appeal and communication had on people's perceptions of the brand and more importantly their propensity to purchase Peperami?

Brand popularity

The campaign clearly demonstrated its ability to raise the perceived popularity of the brand across its two diverse user groups. From a list of competitive brands, both children and young men were twice as likely to mention Peperami in the post stage as a brand popular amongst people of their age.

This helps explain the 150 or so letters Van den Bergh received in 1993 from children and even mothers of younger children requesting VHS copies of the campaign.

Figure 11

Brand interest

The advertising has generated very high levels of increased brand interest amongst both current users and non-users - and across both men and mums.

Figure 12

Brand expectations

This heightened interest is sourced in their greater expectations of the product which have improved significantly across all relevant

attributes.

Figure 13

Likelihood to try

Because of the conceptual subtleties of measuring levels of interest in a brand among children we did not attempt to monitor this criterion. However, we did succeed in measuring their desire to eat Peperami.

Children were asked how much they would like to eat various snack brands, including Peperami. There was a marked improvement in their desire to eat Peperami after the campaign. In fact, boys in particular were 28% more likely to want to eat Peperami post the advertising, with their mean score out of 10 going from 3.88 to 4.96. The mean score for all kids increased by 21%.

This greater desire to eat Peperami was also shared among young men, whose mean score for likelihood to buy for oneself rose from 2.97 to 3.65 after the campaign launch: a 23% increase during the campaign period. Amongst those who definitely recall the advertising, the increase in mean score rises to 38%. Although this may not be causal, since it may include a greater proportion of users, at least it does not contradict the overall finding across the total sample group. (See Figure 14)

For mums, acting as purchasers rather than core consumers of Peperami, their responsiveness to the advertising is even greater than that among young men. Their mean score for likelihood to purchase increases by 26%, whilst those aware of the advertising are 40% more likely to buy Peperami for their children (again, not causal but certainly not contradictory either).

Figure 15

Considering the very way in which the product itself polarises people of all ages, these shifts are even more significant.

From these results, it is clear the advertising successfully generated real interest in the actual purchasing of Peperami not just across its core user groups of young men and kids but also among the core purchasers of Peperami in the supermarket, mums.

Reassuringly, the biggest shifts in increased likelihood to purchase have come from non-users of the brand with rises of 25% among kids, 28% among young men and 34% among mums.

Converting to 'actual' trial

To what extent these potential users actually bought Peperami as a result of their 'claims' to purchase is difficult to quantify.

However, it is these particular findings which best demonstrate the relationship between the advertising and its contribution to generating trial of Peperami.

The shifts in likelihood to purchase among potential users, ranging from 25% to 34%, measured between June and September 1993, are not poles apart from the shifts in actual ever tried figures recorded by NOP, of 40% between January 1993 and April 1994. In the heart of that 15 months there was a dramatic shift in non-users propensity to buy - a shift more likely caused by the advertising than anything else. It is conceivable the dual sitings as a vehicle contributed to generating trial - and we hope they did, since that was what they were designed to do - but it is less conceivable they were capable of provoking the attitudinal change necessary to prompt non-users to trial. Only advertising, communicating the product's meatiness in a provocative and appealing way, thereby raising peoples expectations in the product, could have realistically driven this increased desire to try.

We can safely conclude, therefore, that the Peperami advertising was critical to generating trial of the brand and not just increasing frequency of usage among existing users.

SUMMARY: THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNLEASHING A BEAST

A beast was identified within the make-up of Peperami. The unleashing of it, in the form of the advertising, completely reinvigorated the brand.

With and without the help of the additional distribution gains and unprecedented dual sitings it helped to realise, the campaign generated spectacular value and volume growth for Peperami both during and after the airing and an explosion of its customer base by 40%.

Not content with that and breaking all payback records in Van den Bergh's account books, the advertising continued to perform unabated well into the following year before the second burst picked up the fight.

The impact of this business success is clearly visible in 1994: a doubling of the brand's marketing budget, new films to complement the existing batch, increased NPD activity, acceptance in new trade outlet types (pubs and garage forecourts) and not surprisingly, an upward review of business targets - all the manifestations of a satisfied and more confident client.


Unilever in the States has since tested the films, and on the back of the results will be launching the brand over there! At least a dozen other countries are seriously considering usage of the campaign in their markets.

There is no doubt, that none of this would have been achievable had it not been for advertising with such originality, appeal and sheer intrusiveness.

Only such advertising, borne out of an exhaustive interrogation of the product and the consumer relationship, had the capacity to quite literally enter people's lives in the way we have demonstrated.

NOTES & EXHIBITS

FIGURE 1: PEPERAMI VOLUME DEVELOPMENT 1982-1992



Source: Van den Bergh Foods

FIGURE 2: THE PEPERAMI PERSONALITY MATRIX




FIGURE 3: PEPERAMI MEDIA SCHEDULE






FIGURE 4: PEPERAMI VOLUME SALES: JULY-DECEMBER 1993




Source: Nielsen

FIGURE 5: PEPERAMI SINGLE STICK AND MULTIPACK SALES: JULY-DECEMBER 1993




Source: Nielsen

FIGURE 6: EVER TRIED PEPERAMI: JANUARY 1993 vs APRIL 1994
 Base: 4,058 adults 15+




Source: NOP Omnibus 1993-1994

FIGURE 7: PEPERAMI RATE OF SALE 1993: TOTAL GB GROCERY




Source: Nielsen

FIGURE 8: NET ADVERTISING-RELATED SALES OF PEPERAMI: JULY-DECEMBER 1993




Source: Nielsen, Van den Bergh Foods
 Note: Less effect of distribution and siting gains

FIGURE 9: CLAIMED TV ADVERTISING SUCCESS: MEN 16-24




Source: Millward Brown

FIGURE 10: TOTAL OPINION OF PEPERAMI ADS: CHILDREN




Source: Millward Brown, 1993
Base: Definite recallers: 255

FIGURE 11: POPULARITY OF PEPERAMI: 'WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING BRANDS DO YOU THINK ARE POPULAR AMONGST PEOPLE OF YOUR OWN AGE?' (LIST OF TEN SNACK BRANDS)



Source: Millward Brown, 1993


FIGURE 12: TOTAL EFFECT ON INTEREST IN PEPERAMI



Source: Millward Brown, 1993


Base: Definite recallers: young men 281; mums 220

FIGURE 13: EXPECTATIONS OF PEPERAMI




Source: Millward Brown, 1993
 Base: Definite recallers: young men 418; mums 424

FIGURE 14: LIKELIHOOD TO BUY PEPERAMI FOR ONESELF: YOUNG MEN



Source: Millward Brown, 1993

FIGURE 15: LIKELIHOOD TO BUY PEPERAMI FOR CHILD: MUMS



Source: Millward Brown, 1993

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Institute of Practitioners in Advertising
 44 Belgrave Square, London SW1X 8QS, UK
 Tel: +44 (0)207 235 7020, Fax: +44 (0)207 245 9904
www.ipa.co.uk
www.ipaeffectivenessawards.co.uk



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